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1Introduction:
Over the years, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has consistently
asserted that it does not regulate the practice of medicine (the Practice of
Medicine Exception) . This prohibition has never been specically set forth in
the statutory scheme which guides the FDA's action. However, the Practice of
Medicine Exception has been inferred from the Congressional intent expressed in
the legislative history. Although the FDA purports to maintain this exception,
the reality is that agency action certainly aects medical practice.
The boundaries of the FDA's providence and the Practice of Medicine Excep-
tion is not always clear. This paper traces the historical dividing line between
the role of the FDA in protecting the public from unsafe drugs and medical
devices and the discretion of licensed health care practitioners to engage in the
practice of medicine. This paper then highlights the potentially unreconcilable
dierences between the oft lengthy FDA approval process for drugs and devices
and the more immediate nature of the doctor/patient relationship. It then sets
forth the FDA's inconsistent treatment of the unapproved uses of drugs and de-
vices, which is justied by the non-interference with medical practice. Finally,
this paper sets forth recommendations for reconciling the FDA's position on the
Practice of Medicine Exception.
Overview of FDCA
The basic purpose of the Federal, Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938
(FDCA or the Act) is for the protection of the public
2health and safety.1 Congress clearly intended that the FDA's jurisdiction
be as broad as its literal language indicates2 and the FDCA should be liber-
ally construed. The FDA's mandate should be analyzed in terms of consumer
protection, not dialectics.3 The Act vests broad substantive rulemaking author-
ity in the Secretary of Health and Human Services.4 Regulations promulgated
pursuant to the FDCA will be sustained so long as they are reasonably related
to the purposes of the enabling legislation.5 The Acts' potentially broad cover-
age should be eectuated, even if it would result in far-reaching inroads upon
customary control by local authorities of traditionally local activities.6
Although Congress has given broad regulatory powers to the
1 U.s. v. Diapulse Corp. of America, 457 F.2d 25, 27 (2nd Cir. 1972);
Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Food and Drug Administration, 484 F.Supp.
1179, 1182 (1980) . Legislation that involves issues of safety, must be liberally
construed to eectuate congressional intent. Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall 445
U.S. 1, 13 (1980)
2 U.s. v. Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 798 (1969), reh'g den. 395 U.S. 954.
U.s. v. Urbuteit, 335 U.S. 355, 358 (1948) . Regard for these pur-
poses should infuse construction of the legislation if it is to be treated as a
working instrument of government and not merely as a collection of English
words. U.S. v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280 (1943) reh'g den. 320 U.S. 815.
21 U.S.C.A. x 371(a) (1995)
Mourning v. Family Publications Services, Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369 (1960) .
When agency rulemaking serves the purposes of the statute, courts should refuse
to adopt a narrow construction of the enabling legislation which would undercut
the agency's authority to promulgate such rules. Pharmaceutical Mifra. Ass'n
v. Food and Drug Administration, 484 F.Supp 1179, 1183 (1980)
6 U.S. v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689, 693 (1948)
2
3agency, the FDA cannot alter its jurisdiction by agency action7 and cannot
promulgate regulations which extend or amend the Act itself.8 Also, the expan-
sive discretion given to the FDA pursuant to the Act cannot be exercised in an
unbridled fashion.9
FDCA History Relating to the Practice of Medicine
The Federal Food and Drug Act of 1906 was the rst national statute to
provide for the regulation of the American food and drug supply. Congress gave
FDA the power to remove misbranded or adulterated foods and drugs from the
market.'0 This initial act
did not deal with the issue of regulating the practice of
11
medicine.
Between 1906 and 1938,12 there was no comprehensive attempt to
US. v. Pro-AG, Inc., 796 F.Supp 1219 (1991), a'd 968 F.2d 681 (1992)
8 U.S. v. Antikamnia Chemical Co., 231 U.S. 654 (1914).
The FDA's procedures must satisfy the rudiments of fair play. Rutherford
v. U.S., 429 F.Supp. 506 (1977) (citing Weinberger v. Hynson, 412 U.S. 609,
624 (1973)).
10 See generally, Hutt, Regulation of the Practice of Medicine under the
Pure Food and Drug Laws, 33 Q. Bull. Ass'n of Food & Drug O., No.1, at 7
(1969).
Id.
12 The initial bill was introduced in 1933. After three years of extensive
debate and several versions of the bill, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, urged
Congress to pass legislation during its 73rd Session. President's Message, House
Report, 74th Congress, 2d Sess., vol. 3, pg 1-2 (1936). In spite of the President's
request, the legislation was not enacted for two more years.
During the rancor of the debates, Senator Copeland, the sponsor of the
FDCA, stated: I thought I had all the troubles one could have in this life: but
in all my experience I have never had so many worries and so much trouble as
I have had in connection with this bill. 78 Cong. Rec. 2728 (Feb. 19, 1934).
3
4reform the regulation of food and drugs within the United States. The 1938
Act'3 signicantly expanded the FDA's reach by adding the responsibility of
cosmetic and medical device regulation. The FDCA also provided the agency
with the mandate of assuring the safety of a product prior to it being marketed.'4
Although there was no prohibition within the language of the statue, the leg-
islative history of the FDCA contains many statements that the regulation of
the practice of medicine was outside the purview of the statutory scheme.'5 Dur-
ing the hearings the medical profession expressed concern that the FDCA would
interfere with the prerogatives of the doctor.'6 In response, Senator Copeland
stated that this bill makes certain that the medical practitioner shall not be
interfered with in his practice. 'v
Amendments to the statutory language prior to passing the FDCA also in-
dicate an intent on the part of Congress to not interfere with medical practice.
Initially section 321(b) of the 1938 Act, dening the term drug, contained lan-
guage stating that it was
'~ Congress enacted the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938 and
repealed its forerunner, the Federal Food and Drugs Act of June 30 1906. 21
U.S.C.A. x 301 et seq.
Id.
15 Senator Copeland, a strong proponent of the legislation, was a physician
and was mindful of the potential impact such legislation could have on the
medical profession. See, Hutt, Regulation of the Practice of Medicine under the
Pure Food and Drug Laws, 33 Q. Bull. Ass'n of Food & Drug O. No.1, at 15
(1969)
16 78 Cong. Rec. at 2728.
17 Id.
4
5not intended for the regulation of the legalized practice of the healing art.'8
Committee reports indicate that the bill was not intended as a medical prac-
tices act and [would] not interfere with the practice of the healing art by chiro-
practors and others in the States where they are licensed by law to engage in
such practice.'9 Although, this proviso was omitted in the nal version of the
bill, the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce which submitted the
report to Congress explicitly explained the deletion in order to avoid possible
misunderstanding as to the intention of the committee.20 The committee stated
that the phrase was ultimately omitted because the words were unnecessary as
Et] he bill does not undertake to regulate the practice of the healing art.2'
However, despite several comments that the FDCA would not regulate the
practice of medicine, Congress enacted labeling requirements that applied to pre-
scription drugs over objections from representatives of the medical profession.22
H. Rep No. 2755, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess. 5 (1936).
Chaney v. Heckler, 718 F.2d 1174, 1180 fn.13 (1983), rev'd 470 U.S. 821
(1985) (quoting S.Rep. No. 361, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1935); S.Rep. No 646,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1935)).
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Pharmaceutical Mfrs Ass'n, 484 F.Supp. at 1184 (citing Hearings on
S. 5 Before a Subcom. of the Senate Commerce Coin., 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
148 (1935); Hearings on H.R. 6906 Before a Subcom. of the House Coin. on
Interstate and Foreign commerce, 74th cong., 1st Sess. at 316, 322 (1935)
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6In 1951, the Durham Humphrey Amendment23 was the rst major amend-
ment to the 1938 Act. The amendments exempted prescription drugs from
previous FDA labeling provisions and claried the distinction between over-
the-counter drugs and prescription medications.24 The adequate directions for
use and warnings against misuse requirements~ were deemed unnecessary if the
prescription label contained specied information for use and any necessary
cautionary statements.26
There are only sparse references in the House or Senate hearings and re-
ports that refer to the prescription drug exemption as it relates to the practice
of medicine. One comment, however, indicated that the warning requirement
of section 352(f) (2) was unnecessary when a prescription medication was pre-
scribed because the practitioner had the responsibility to see that the drug
would be properly used.27
23 65 Stat. 648 (1951), codied in 21 U.S.C.A x 353(b)
24 21 U.S.C.A. x 353 et seq. The 1938 Acts was ambiguous, thus permitting
a manufacturer to determine whether a drug would be sold as by prescription
or over-the-counter. This lead to situations where the same drug could be clas-
sied as an over-the-counter preparation by one manufacturer and classied as
a prescription drug by another. The Durham-Humphrey Amendment sought to
remedy this dilemma by vesting the FDA as the sole determinator of prescrip-
tion drug status. Temin, The Origin of Compulsory Drug Prescriptions, 22 J.
of Law & Econ. 91 (1979).
21 U.S.C.A. x 352(f).
26 21 U.S.C.A. x 353 (b) (2) For a general discus-
sion see,
Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n , 484 F.Supp at 1185.
27 Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n, 484 F.Supp at 1185 (citing remarks from
the Federal Security Administrator Oscar Ewing, Hearings on H.R. 3298 Before
the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 82nd Cong., 1st
Sess. 20-21 (1951)).
7Thus, the Durham-Humphrey Amendment did not appear to increase any
regulatory control over the practice of medicine. In fact, the exemption of pre-
scription drugs from the requirements of section 352(f) gave physicians primary
responsibility to inform the patient as to the adequate directions for use any
necessary warnings regarding misuse.28 However the court in Pharmaceutical
Mfrs. Ass'n, stated that the amendment did not strip the Commissioner of the
regulatory authority he had possessed for thirteen years over prescription drug
labeling.29
The Drug Amendments Act of 1962,30 signicantly expanded the FDA's
responsibilities regarding new drug regulations and for the rst time gave FDA
power to scrutinize and evaluate drugs for eectiveness as well as safety.31 How-
ever, the Drug Amendments contain some specic exclusions to the FDA's ju-
risdiction that continue provide support for the Practice of Medicine Exception.
For example, section 374 gives the FDA extensive powers to inspect facilities,
vehicles, materials, containers, and records to determine whether prescription
drugs or restricted devices have been adulterated or misbranded.32 However,
Congress specically
28 Id. at 1185.
29 Id. at 1186 (the court concluded that when the Commissioner determines
that the possible side eects of a drug when used as customarily prescribed are
suciently serious as to be material to the patient's decision on use of the drug,
he or she may require disclosure of those side eects on the labeling)
30 Pub.L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 781 (1962)
Weinberger v. Hynson, 412 U.S. 609, 630 (1973)
32 21 U.S.C.A. x 374(a) (1).
7
8exempted licensed practitioners who administer, prepare or manufacture drugs
or devices solely for use in the course of their professional practice.33 Addition-
ally, the amendments require that producers of drugs or devices must register
with the Secretary of Health and Human Services.34 Again, licensed practition-
ers who prescribe or administer drugs or devices and who manufacture, prepare,
propagate, compound, or process drugs or devices solely for use in the course of
their professional practice are also exempted from this requirement.35
In 1972, the FDA issued a Notice of Proposed Rule Making regarding, in
part, the issue of prescriptions written for uses unapproved by the FDA.36 The
proposed rule indicated that a prescription new drug is not permitted to be
shipped in interstate commerce if the intended use is not contained in the ap-
proved uses set forth in the labeling.37 An unapproved use even includes ac-
tions such as a dierent dosage or a dierent patient population or a dierent
regimen.38 However, the rule states that once a new drug has been introduced
into interstate commerce,
21 U.S.C.A. x 374 (a) (2) (B)
21 U.S.C.A. x 360(a) (1) & (b)
21 U.S.C.A. x 360(g) (2).
36 Legal Status of Approved Labeling for Prescription Drugs; Prescribing
for Uses Unapproved by the Food and Drug Administration, 37 Fed.Reg. 16503
(1972)
Id. at 16504. The labeling of a prescription new drug contains all information
regarding the conditions for which there is substantial evidence that the drug is
safe and eective. Id.
38 Id.
8
9a physician may prescribe the drug for an unapproved use if the prescription is
written as part of the practice of medicine.
Pursuant to the proposed rule, if the FDA determines that an unapproved
use of a new drug may pose a danger to the patients receiving the medication,
the agency may conne distribution of the drug to specied channels or restrict
the physicians who are able to prescribe the drug. The FDA would have the
power under the proposed rule to permit only physicians with specied quali-
cations to prescribe, dispense or administer certain medications.41 This action
would impact some physician groups, in the context of their doctor/patient re-
lations, in limiting their ability to prescribe the medication of their choosing.
Only specialists or particularly qualied physicians would be permitted to treat
patients with certain designated medications. This action, more than any other
would interject the FDA in to the doctor's oce.
The FDA has stated that this rule expresses its established policy.42 How-
ever, this author could not locate any instance of enforcement action involving
the FDA's limiting the prescription of a specied medication to a particular
medical specialty. This is perhaps in recognition of the impact this rule could
have on the doctor-patient relationship.
Id.
Id.
41 Id. at 16504-05.
42 See generally, Food and Drug Law at 621, note 1.
9
10Interestingly, for almost twenty years, the FDA did not take nal action on
this proposed regulation. In August of 1991 the FDA issued a Notice of Intent
to withdraw certain proposed rules for which a nal rule or notice of withdrawal
had not been issued, including the rule regarding the prescription of drugs for
uses unapproved by the FDA.43 Later that same year, the FDA decided not
to withdraw this proposed rule but also not proceed to a nal rule. The FDA
stated that the agency has established an Unlabeled Use Task Force to examine
the promotion and use of prescription dugs for indications not included in their
approved labeling. ... Therefore, the agency will defer consideration on the
withdrawal of this proposed rule until after the task force has completed its
review.45
Although this paper primarily focuses on the practice of medicine as it relates
to prescription medications, it also discusses medical device issues where they
are pertinent. Therefore a brief background of the FDCA treatment of medical
devices is included. The 1976 Medical Device Amendments Act fundamentally
restructured the FDA's approach to the regulation of medical devices. The
amendments require premarket notication
56 Fed.Reg. 42668-01.
56 Fed.Reg. 67440 (1991)
Id. at 67442. This author could not locate any further published action on
this issue.
46 Unlike the 1962 changes in the law governing drugs, the Medical Device
Amendments were the culmination of fteen years of study and debate, not
only within congress and the agency, but also among representatives of clinical
medicine, biomedical engineering,
10
11for devices substantially equivalent to those already on the market and premar-
ket approval for new medical devices.47 The Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990,
further strengthened and dened the FDA's role in the medical device arena.48
Scope of the Practice of Medicine Exception:
As noted in the previous section, there are several references throughout the
enactment and amendments to the FDCA that indicate the role of the agency is
not to regulate the practice of medicine or otherwise interfere with the practice
of the healing arts.49 However, the scope of this general terminology and thus
the Practice of Medicine Exception, has never been clearly dened.
As the right to privacy developed in the courts, it was initially argued that
the doctor-patient relationship should be protected as a privacy interest. The
Supreme Court in declaring the right of privacy50 to be a fundamental right,
carved out two types of privacy interests. One type of privacy right is the
interest in non-disclosure of personal matters;51 the other type of
device manufacturers, and consumer groups. Hutt & Merrill, Food and Drug
Law 13 (2nd ed. 1991).
Food and Drug Administration Performance and Accountability Act of 2996,
Senate Report 104-284, 104th Cong., 2nd Sess., preamble at 5 (1996) (here-
inafter referred to as the Kassebaum Bill)
48 Codied at 21 U.S.C.A. x 531 et seq.
See supra, fn. 15-21 and accompanying text.
50 The right of privacy is founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept
of personal liberty and restriction upon state action. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 152, 155 (1973)
51 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977)
11
12privacy interest involves the interest in independence in making certain kinds
of important decisions.52 In Paul v. Davis,53 the Supreme Court characterized
the latter privacy interest as matters relating to marriage, procreation, contra-
ception, family relationships, and child rearing and education.54
In California, defendants convicted of prescribing and selling laetrile, an
unapproved drug for the treatment in cancer, argued that there was a consti-
tutionally protected privacy interest in a right to in medical treatment.55 The
defendants argued that the state statute prohibiting the sale, delivery, prescrip-
tion or administration of any drug or device that has not been approved by
the designated federal agency, was unconstitutional based on a compelling state
interest standard.56 The Privitera court declined to follow the defendants' po-
sition and held that the types of important decisions deemed fundamental by
the Supreme Court did not include medical treatment.57
52 Id. at 599-600.
242 U.S. 693 (1976)
Id. at 713.
People v. Privitera, 23 Cal.3d 697, 701 (1979) cert. den. 44 U.S. 949
(defendants were convicted of the felony of conspiracy to sell or prescribe an
unapproved drug, in violation of state law)
56 Id. at 701.
Id. at 702; see also, People v. Younghanz, 156 Cal.App.3:
811, 816 (1984) (the right to seek a cure for one's illness is no:
a fundamental right)
12
13In Rutherford v. U.S.,58 the trial court held that terminally
ill cancer patients had a fundamental right to receive medical treat-
ment whether or not it was approved by the FDA. The court stated that [bly
denying the right to use a nontoxic substance in connection with one's own per-
sonal health-care, FDA has oended the constitutional right of privacy.59 The
trial court granted petitioners' request to enjoin the federal government from
interfering with the shipment and sale of Laetrilei0 The Supreme Court reversed
the decision on other grounds and remanded the case for consideration of the
constitutional issues.6' On remand, the court of appeals held that patients do
not have a fundamental interest in their selection of a particular treatment and
that the availability of specic medication is within the area of governmental
interest in protecting public health.62 The Supreme Court denied certiorari, so
it seems clear that patients do not have a constitutional right to receive the
medical treatment of their choosing and doctors do not have the unfettered
ability to provide medical care that is within the jurisdiction of the FDA and
58 ~ F.Supp (1975), a'd and remanded, 542 F.2d 1137
(1976), on remanded to, 424 F.Supp 105 (1977), on remanded to, 438
F.Supp 1287, remanded by, 582 F.2d 1234 (1978), reversed, 442 U.S.
544 (1979) , on remand to, 616 F.2d 455 (1980) , cert. denied, 449
U.S. 937.
Rutherford, 438 F.Supp. 1287, 1310 (1977)
Rutherford, 339 F.Supp. 1208.
61 442 U.S. 544.
62 Rutherford, 616 F.2d 455, 457 (The premarketing requirement of the
[FDA] ... is an exercise of Congressional authority to limit the patient's choice
of medication)
13
14that the FDA has not approved.
Because the right to receive medical treatment is not a fundamental right,
the appropriate standard of review of any legislation would be the rational basis
test rather than the compelling state interest test. It should be noted that any
regulation promulgated by the FDA is subject to even less scrutiny. A regu-
lation, properly enacted is only subject to attack on constitutional grounds.63
The challenged regulation will be deemed valid unless it is plainly inconsistent
with the provisions of the Act under which it was promulgated .~
In 1985, the Commissioner of the FDA took the position that the legal
basis of the Practice of Medicine Exception was based on the premise that
individual states had the responsibility to license and regulate medical practice65
and therefore, the FDA could not regulate in this arena. The Chaney court
dismissed this premise and stated: There is scant legislative history on the
subject, but the few sentences that can be found are more fairly
63 Byrd v. U.S., 154 F.2d 62, 63 (5th Cir. 1946).
Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 278 F.Supp. 786, 788 (1968) , a'd in part,
rev, in part, 419 F.2d 21 (1969)
65 If the FDA were correct that physicians' use of drugs is not within FDA's
jurisdiction simply because physicians are licensed by the states, then it would
necessarily follow that FDA could have no authority to regulate drugs that
state-licensed physicians administer to prison inmates in experimental clinical
investigations and no authority to regulate drugs that state-licensed veterinar-
ians use to put animals to their death. But FDA has in fact regulated drugs
used in prison clinical investigations
and in veterinary practices .... In both situations FDA
has rejected arguments that it does not have authority to regulate
unapproved uses of approved drugs. Chaney, 718 F.2d at 1180
(reversed on other grounds)
14
15read as reecting that the states do regulate the practice of medicine and that a
physician cannot be eligible for the practice-of medicine exemption if he has not
been so licensed. The practice-of-medicine exemption itself, however, cannot be
attributed to the states' licensing of their physicians. The better explanation
for the practice-of-medicine exemption is that Congress did not want to inter-
fere with physicians' treatment of their patients.~ The basis of the Practice of
Medicine Exception is not appropriately derived from deference to state action
but rather a manifestation of Congressional intent that the FDA should not
interject itself into the realm of the doctor/patient relationship.
The FDA has made it clear that although it will not oversee the practice
of medicine, it will properly control what drugs are available to physicians.67
The Court in U.S. v. Rutherford,68 held that the distribution of Laetrile was
prohibited for any use until it was approved by the FDA. Although the Court
did not explicitly address the practice of medicine exception, its holding nec-
essarily places limitations on a physician's unfettered practice of medicine by
interpreting the Act as intending a pre-market approval process applicable to
all drugs, whether sold over-the-counter or by
Id. at 1180.
67 ~ Fed.Reg. at 16504.
68 442 U.S. 544 (1979)
15
16prescription.69 In the FDCA 70 Congress has required the FDA Commissioner
to assure that all 'new drugs' are safe and eective for the use under the condi-
tions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling.71 In order for the
FDA to allow a new drug into interstate commerce, there must be substantial
evidence, upon which experts in the eld could conclude, that the drug is safe
and eective.72
Dening the boundaries of the Practice of Medicine Exception is not a facile
task. Therefore, the extent and manner to which the FDA can impinge on
medical practice is not certain. What is
69 U.S. v. Algon Chemical Inc., 879 F.2d 1154, 1161 (3rd Cir. 1989); see
also U.S. v. Evers, 643 F.2d. 1043, 1048 (5th Cir. 1981) (Of course, while
the Act was not intended to regulate the practice of medicine, it was obviously
intended to control the availability of drugs for prescribing by physicians)
70 21 U.S.C.A. x 331 et. seq.
See generally, 21 U.S.C.A. x 355. [W]hen the FDA grants approval [of a drug]
it is not merely of a drug substance, but additionally represents approval of a
safe process of manufacture, This process involves consideration of such issues
as where the raw materials come from, which inactive ingredients are going to
be added and in what measure, how the drug will be packaged and how shelf-life
will be maintained. Algon Chemical Inc., 879 F.2d at 1161.
72 The new drug provision of the Act requires the ling of a new drug
application (NDA) which must include full reports of investigations showing the
safety and eectiveness of the drug; a list of articles used as components of the
drug; a description of the composition of the drug; a description of the methods,
facilities and controls used to produce the drug; samples of the drug; and the
proposed labeling. 21 U.S.C.A x 355(b) (1). The applicant must then wait up
to one hundred and eighty days or longer, to have the application approved or
denied. 21 U.S.C.A x355 (c). It is unlawful to introduce any new drug into
interstate commerce prior to the FDA's approval of the NDA which establishes
the drug as safe and eective for its intended use. 21 U.S.C.A x355(a)
16
17clear is that the lengthy FDA approval process for most drugs and devices, does
not dovetail with the patients immediate needs in a clinical setting. Currently,
there are two pending bills that seek, in part, to essentially clarify the FDA's
Practice of Medicine Exception.
Proposed Access to Medical Treatment Act
In Retkwa v. Orentreich, the defendants argued that because Congress did
not intend that the FDCA interfere with the practice of medicine, the FDA
could not prohibit the use by a physician of any product whether or not it was
approved or adulterated.73 The court refused such statutory construction and
stated there was no authority for the proposition that the Act was inapplicable
to physicians using a drug or device which was never approved for any purpose.74
However, the proposed Access to Medical Treatment Act (ANTA) would permit
just such a scenario.
The ANTA highlights the potentially irreconcilable dierences between pro-
tection of the public from unsafe or ineective medical treatments and the free-
dom of a doctor to determine the course of treatment for her patients. Although
the ANTA does not specically address the FDA's Practice of Medicine Excep-
tion, in essence, the bill is an attempt to codify this exception and signicantly
expand its breath.
Retkwa v. Orentriech, 579 N.Y.S.2d 577, 580 (1991)
Id.; see also, Algon Chem, Inc., 879 F.2d 1154 (ct concluded that the practice
of medicine exemption did not protec:
physician's preparation of an unapproved illegal drug)
17
18On May 19, 1994, Senator Daschle75 introduced the original version of the
ANTA.76 The purpose of the legislation is to allow patients an increased free-
dom of choice of available medical treatments.17 Senator Daschle stated: The
ANTA represents a signicant departure from current medical practice. It is
grounded in the belief that our current health care delivery system actually dis-
courages rather than encourages the development of alternative therapies that
could eectively treat illnesses that often do not respond well, if at all, to con-
ventional medicine. And it seeks to open up the system to such treatments
under controlled conditions. ,,78
The intent of the proposed legislation is two-fold. Firstly, it seeks to permit
increased access to alternative treatments not currently approved by the FDA
for use. Secondly, in allowing increased opportunities for use of alternative
treatments, additional eective treatments and cures may be found.79 The eect
of the ANTA is that treatments considered alternative, or
Senators Harkin, Pell, Grassley, Haeld, and Deconcini
also sponsored the initial bill. 140 Cong. Rec. S6123-02, S6130
(May 19, 1994)
76 Id.
The term medical treatment is dened in the act as any food, drug or device,
or procedure that is used and intended as a cure, mitigation, treatment, or
prevention of disease. ANTA x 2 (10) . The terms food, drug and device have
the same meaning given such terms in the FDCA. Id. x (3), (4) & (5)
78 Id. The Medical Treatment Act seeks to guarantee all Americans the
freedom to choose not only their doctor but also the form of treatment they
want to pursue. 140 Cong. Rec. at E1657.
Id.
18
19out of the mainstream of conventional medical acceptance, would be more avail-
able to the general public.
The bill is an attempt to circumvent the FDA approval process for treat-
ments desired by a patient and that a licensed health care practitioner is willing
to administerA~ The concern with the current FDA process is that its stringent
requirements are time consuming and extremely costly, preventing many poten-
tially eective treatments from receiving FDA approval.8' Some argue that only
large conglomerates have the nancial backing to survive the time and expense
of the FDA approval process. It is generally estimated that it can take up to
fteen years for the approval of a new drug and the process may cost up to ve
hundred million dollars 82
The heavy demands and requirements of the FDA approval process, and the
time and expense involved in meeting them, serve
Notwithstanding any other provision of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act, a person may (1) introduce or deliver into interstate commerce a
food, drug, device, or any other equipment; produce a food, drug, device, or
any other equipment, solely for use in accordance with this Act if there have
been no advertising claims by the manufacturer, distributor, or seller. ANTA x
6.
81 Senator Daschle stated: It will be asked why this legislation is necessary.
If a particular alternative treatment is so eective, then why can't it simply
go through the standard FDA approval process? The answer is that the time
and expense currently required to gain FDA approval of a treatment makes it
very dicult for all but large pharmaceutical companies to undertake such an
arduous and costly endeavor. 141 Cong. Rec. S9998-02, S99999 (July 14 1995)
82 104-28 Food and Drug Administration Performance and
Accountability Act of 1995, 5. 1477, 104th Cong. 2nd Sess., p.6
(1996) (citing DiMasik Trends in Drug Development Cost, Times, and
Risks, 29 Drug Information Journal 375, 382 (April-June 1995)); see
also, 141 Cong. Rec. E1424-0l, E1425 (July 12, 1995)
19
20to limit access to the potentially innovative contributions of individual practi-
tioners, scientists, smaller companies, and others who do not have the nancial
resources to traverse the painstakingly detailed path to certication.83 Addi-
tionally, many alternative treatments involve natural products and are thus not
able to be patented. Often without a patent on a medical treatment, an individ-
ual or company may not be able to recoup the signicant nancial investment
necessary for FDA approval. Thus, the FDA approval requirements may prevent
market access to relatively inexpensive, alternative treatments .~
The current bill~ provides that a patient has a right to receive any medical
treatment from a health care practitioner86
83 a remark by Representative Defazio - cite needed Dr. Najarian (recently
acquitted of violating provisions of the FDCA) developed an anitrejection serum
for use in organ transplants. He indicated that the laboratory that originally
slated to manufacture the drug was too small to handle the enormous cost of
getting FDA approval for marketing, and dropped the project after about a
year. Star-Tribune, Minneapolis-St. Paul (February 26, 1996).
141 Cong. Rec. at E1424.
85 Amended from the original version and reintroduced on July 14, 1995.
141 Cong. Rec. S9998-02 (July 14, 1995); see also 1995 Cong U.S. 5 1035, 104th
Cong, 1st Sess (July 14, 1995)
A similar bill was introduced on July 12, 1995, with wide
bipartisan support, in the House of Representatives by
Representative Defazio of Oregon (53 Co-sponsors: 28 Democrats and
23 Republicans). 142 Cong. Rec. H4115-01; see also, 1995 Cong.
U.S. HR 2019, 104th cong., 1st Sess. (July 12, 1995).
The bill did not pass either the House or the Senate during the second session
of the 104th Congress. However, the legislation will likely be re-introduced in
the 105th Congress. The Tan Sheet 4(32):13-15, The News This Week (Aug. 5,
1996).
86 Health Care Practitioner is dened as physician or another person who is
legally authorized to provide health professional services in the State in which
the services are provided. ANTA x 2((6).
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21even if such treatment is not approved, certied or licensed by the Secretary of
Health and Human Services.87 The treatment is permitted if there is no reason-
able basis to conclude that the medical treatment itself, when used as directed,
poses an unreasonable and signicant risk of danger to the patient.88 The term
danger in the bill means any negative reaction that causes serious harm; oc-
curred as a result of a method of medical treatment; would not otherwise have
occurred; and is more serious than reactions experienced with routinely used
medical treatments for the same medical condition or conditions.89
The ANTA includes what the sponsors state are carefully circumscribed
conditions in order to protect the public yet allow greater access to treatment.~
The bill requires that a licensed health care practitioner personally examine the
patient9' and give the patient a written warning that the treatment has not
been approved by the Federal Government A The health care
87 Id. x 3(a).
88 Id. x 3(b) (1)
89 Id. x 2(2).
141 Cong. Rec. at S9999.
ANTA x 3 (a) (1). This provision was added to the amended bill to strengthen
consumer protection. 141 Cong. Rec. S9998-02, S10002 (July 14, 1995)
The required written warning states: WARNING: this
food, drug, or device has not been declared to be safe and
eective by the Federal Government and any individual who uses
such food, drug, or device, does so at his or her own risk. ANTA
x 3(b) (2) (B). This requirement was also added to the amended bill.
141 Cong. Rec. at S10002.
21
22practitioner is prohibited from making any advertising claims regarding the
ecacy of the proposed treatment93 although she is not prohibited from making
claims, in person, to her patient~ or from reporting her results to the medical
community as long as she has no nancial interest in the treatment.95 Finally,
the patient must give an informed consent prior to receiving the treatment.~
ANTA x 3 (b) (4) . The bill strictly regulates the circumstances under which
claims regarding the ecacy of a treatment can be made. It is designed to
prohibit all claims by individuals for whom the underlying intent of promoting
the treatment might be linked to personal nancial gain. What this means
is that there can be no marketing of any treatment administered under this
bill. As such, I see very little incentive for anyone to try to use this bill as a
bypass to the process of obtaining FDA approval. . .. In short, If an individual
or a company wants to earn a prot o of their product, they would be wise
to go through the standard FDA approval process rather than utilizing this
legislation. Comments of Senator Daschle, 141 Cong. Rec. S9998-02, 510000.
ANTA x 3 (c) (1)
Subsection (b) (4) shall not apply to an accurate and truthful reporting by
a health care practitioner of the results of the practitioner's administration of
a medical treatment in recognized journals, at seminars, conventions, or similar
meetings, or to others, so long as the reporting practitioner has not direct or
indirect nancial interest in the reporting of the material and has received not
nancial benets of any kind from the manufacturer, distributor, or other seller
for such reporting. Id. x 3(c) (2)
The ANTA, section 3(b) (3) provides that such individual has been informed
in writing of the nature of the medical treatment, including -
(A) the contents and methods of such treatment;
(B) the anticipated benets of such treatment; (C) any reasonably
foreseeable side eects that may result from such treatment;
(D) the results of past applications of such treatment by the health
care practitioner and others; and
(E) any other information necessary to fully meet the requirements
for informed consent of human subjects prescribei by regulations issued by the
Food and Drug Administration.
The patient must also desire the treatment and sign a statement
22
23If the practitioner determines that the treatment itself was a danger to the
patient, the practitioner is required to report the adverse reaction to the Sec-
retary of Health and Human Services. The Secretary then has the ability to
assess the potential danger and disseminate information regarding the nature
of the danger.98 The practitioner also is mandated to report benecial eects of
a life-saving treatment if they signicantly exceed the positive eects that are
expected from a conventional medical treatment for the same condition.~
The sponsors of the Senate and House bills assert that the ANTA is not
intended to undercut the FDA's authority or its approval process, but rather
the legislation seeks to compliment it.'~ The sponsors state the FDA would
continue to protect the general public from unsafe drugs and medical devises,
'~' while this legislation would allow individuals greater choice in their own
medical care.
Curtailment of authority
Although there is sparse public information regarding the FDA's position
on this bill, it is clear that the FDA is concerned
this eect. Id. x 3(b) (6).
Id. x 4(a).
98 Id. x 4(b).
Id.x5.
'~ 141 Cong. Rec. at S9999 (discussing Senate version of the bill) ; 140
Cong. Rec. at E1657 (discussing House version of the bill)
Id.
23
24about the eect such legislation would have on its existing authority to protect
the public from unsafe drugs and devices. The FDA's Executive Assistant to the
Commissioner commented that the agency's authority to remove products from
the market would be compromised.'02 The FDA stated that pursuant to bill, the
only authority the FDA would have when it learned of a dangerous treatment
would be to publicize the fact. This deprives the FDA of any authority to remove
products from the market even after there were reports of harm or deaths, or
even when the product is clearly fraudulent.'03 Senator Harkin denied that the
bill language supported the FDA's position.'~ He indicated there is nothing in
this bill that would prohibit FDA from removing a clearly fraudulent or .. .
dangerous product from the market. This is in the law.'05
What Constitutes Danger
The FDA's mandate is to determine both safety and ecacy prior to allowing
a drug or device on the market. In contrast, the ANTA permits only non-
dangerous treatment options to be utilized by
102 The Gray Sheet, Industry & Washington Memos 22(32) (Aug.
5, 1996) . The FDAer likened the wakening of the agency's authority to the
years before passage of the 1938 Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 'when FDA
could do little more than warn the public and had no authority to assure the
submission of reliable information or correct harmful situations. The Tan Sheet
4(32), The News This Week (Aug 5, 1996)
103 The Gray Sheet, Industry & Washington Memos 22(32) (Aug.
5, 1996)
Id.
8 Health News Daily No 155, p.3 (July 31, 1996)
24
25health care practitioners, but it does not require a treatment to be eective.
In fact, it is expected that ineective treatment options will be placed into the
steam of commerce and market forces will be sucient to cull them out.1c16
Thus, this bill would remove the FDA from being the initial forum where safety
and eectiveness of a new drug or device is determined.'07
It is also unclear what would actually qualify as an unreasonable and signif-
icant risk of danger. Representative Pallone stated that if a treatment is found
to be harmful, it must be reported ... and it cannot be used again.'08 This com-
ment makes it seem that if one patient is injured by the alternative treatment,
the treatment must be discontinued. However, the language of the ANTA does
not seem to support the Representative's assertion. The bill requires reporting
adverse events only when they are worse than reactions that are caused by tra-
ditional therapies used for the same condition.lc~ However, potentially, serious
harm can ow from the most common of treatments: One could die from an
allergic response to aspirin. Since serious harm is a rare but actual risk of vir-
tually any medical treatment, arguably only an extremely serious reaction, such
as death, need be
'~ The Tan Sheet, The News This Week, 3(31) (July 1995).
'~ The court in U.S. v. General Nutrition, 638 F.Supp 556 (1986), stated
that in cases where there is not recognized safety and ecacy of a new drug (or
device), the initial determination of such issues should be the FDA. Id. at 561.
108 140 Cong. Rec. E1657-03, E1657; see also, 141 Cong. Rec. at S9999.
'~ ANTA x 2(2)(D).
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26reported. Therefore, it is unclear what types of negative reactions a practitioner,
using a nonapproved drug or medical devise, would be required to report. 110
Additionally a negative reaction must only be reported if it resulted from the
alternative treatment itself.' Most health care practitioners are not researchers,
and without a controlled study it may be virtually impossible to determine the
cause of an adverse reaction. Many of these unapproved medical practices would
also be administered in conjunction with traditional therapies, making it even
more dicult for the practitioner to assess the source of the negative reaction.
Because of the ambiguity, many practitioners may not report a serious adverse
reaction to an alternative treatment.
Additionally, even if a practitioner reported a dangerous outcome to an un-
approved treatment, the FDA would likely have diculty reviewing any reported
instances of harm. The report would not be derived from a controlled clinical
study. Because of the likelihood of the patient receiving other treatments in
addition to the unapproved treatment, it may be impossible for the FDA assess
the nature of the danger of an alternative treatment.
It is also unclear if the denition of danger would include a safe but ineective
treatment that caused harm simply by
110 The FDA commented that under the bill, the way danger is
dened, a negative reaction may not be reported even though it's
a very serious one. 58(32) The Pink Sheet, In Brief (Aug. 5
1996)
' ANTA x 2(2) (B).
26
27preventing a patient from seeking other helpful therapy. The language of the
ANTA seems to focus on the nature of the treatment and not that another
treatment was foregone that could have been eective. Delay in the institution
of eective therapy caused by the use of an ineective medical treatment can
cause a disease to progress beyond the ability to treat.2 However, individuals
suering from terminal diseases for which there does not exist a conventional
eective treatment should arguably have the right to seek alternative treatments
that may show a potential for cure. The issue of danger seems to become less
important when the patient is terminal and without other viable options.3
HamPer Important Data Collection
The FDA has stated that this bill might hamper the current drug devel-
opment process and reduce or eliminate controlled trials which allow the sys-
tematic and scientic collection of data.4 Representative Waxman also expressed
concern with allowing patient access to unapproved treatments without the con-
comitant requirement of data collection to assess safety and ecacy. What we
need to do is support research, to make drugs available, if possible, while they
are experimented upon to decide whether they are ecacious.
[W]e don't want people taken advantage of and exploited by
112 Durovic v. Richardson, 479 F.2d 242, 250 (7th Cir. 1973)
113 But see contra, (doesn't the KB have statements by physicians saying
that cannot tell until dead?)
~ See generally, 58(32) The Pink Sheet, In Brief (Aug. 5 1996)
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28snake oil salesmen.5 It is only by the use of carefully controlled and monitored
studies of experimental treatments that data may be obtained to understand the
benets a patient may receive, or the risks that may result, from a treatment.
The potential lack of data collection also relates to the issue of informed
consent. The bill states that a patient has not given informed consent until
she has been apprised, in writing, of the risks and benets of the proposed
treatment, including the results of past applications of such treatment by the
health care practitioner and others.6 If controlled studies and data collection
are not required, the patient may have access to merely antidotal evidence.
The mechanism by which a health care practitioner should gather information
from others is uncertain and even if obtained, the information would likely be
antidotal as well. This may have the eect of having a treatment gain wide
spread use without the accompanied gathering of data and knowledge regarding
the safety and ecacy of the treatment.7
Advertising
The FDA views the ANTA's labeling and advertising restrictions to be in-
adequate to 'assure patients will not be
~ The Pink Sheet, Trade & Govt. Memos, 58(10) (March 4 1996)
116 ANTA x 3(3) (D)
' The FDA stated that: Allowing wide dissemination of a treatment and
subsequent widespread use combined with little accountability or liability sig-
nicantly reduces the incentive for manufacturers and health care practitioners
to conduct studies of safety and eectiveness. The Tan Sheet, The News This
Week, 4(32) :13-15 (Aug. 5, 1996).
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29misled into accepting unsafe treatments.'8 the FDA wants to insure that termi-
nally ill people - our most vulnerable citizens - are not victims of health fraud.9
The proponents respond that the bill prohibits any product labeling which is
false or misleading. The FDA, of course, wants to approve each and every la-
bel. This is a degree of control which is simply not possible if we are to make
alternative treatments available.'20
Access to Treatments
Additionally, the FDA claims that the FDCA currently allows patients ac-
cess to experimental treatments under the IND process.'2' The FDCA provides
that new drugs and medical devices can be made available to patients early
in the testing process. 122 The IND process also has provisions to potentially
accommodate a small group of patients or even an individual patient. Treat-
ment IND's for severely debilitating and life-threatening diseases also provide
for early availability of certain treatments.'23
Contrary to the FDA's assertions that medical treatment was appropriately
available via the IND process, James Gordon, MD, the
118 Id.
Id.
120 141 Cong.Rec. at 10002.
121 21 U.S.C.A. x 355 et. seq.
122 The FDA stated that a patient could receive. Virtually any new medical
treatment for which FDA has oversight. The Pink Sheet, In Brief, 58(32) (Aug.
5 1996).
123 The Tan Sheet 4(32):13-15, The News This Week (Aug. 5,
1996)
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30Director of the Center for Mind-Body Medicine testied that the FDA approach
often did not work within the alternative medicine approach. In treating each
patient with a holistic approach, a practitioner may treat each patient with
dierent combinations of substances. Doctor Gordon stated that if he were to
ask for an IND for every modality, herb and supplement that he used, he'd be
spending [his] whole life petitioning the FDA.'24 As noted above, the language of
this bill presents several questions and concerns regarding its scope and ultimate
eectiveness. Additionally, although it is certain that Congress intended some
type of Practice of Medicine Exception, this bill seems to inappropriately restrict
the FDA's oversight of the drug and device approval process.
Kassebaum Bill
Unlike the ANTA, Senator Kassebaum's initiative, seeks to make widespread
changes to the FDCA. Although the Food and Drug Administration Perfor-
mance and Accountability Act of 1996 (Kassebaum Bill) did not pass in the
104 Congress, second session, it is expected to be reintroduced this session.
Although the bill does not specically mention the Practice of Medicine Excep-
tion,'~ some of the proposed reform would clarify the dividing
124 Id.
125 There is also a bill in The House of Representatives, which seeks to
reform the FDCA. H.R. 3119, 104th Congress, 2nd Sess. (1996) . The House
Report specically states: Nothing in the Act shall be construed to limit or
interfere with the authority of a health care practitioner, licensed by law to
administer drugs and devices, to prescribe or administer any legally marketed
drug or device to a patient for any condition or disease within a legitimate health
care practitioner-patient relationship. H.R.
3199, x 909.
30
31line between appropriate FDA action and medical practice. One aspect of the
bill addresses the issue of the availability of drugs and devices that have not
yet received FDA approval and the use of approved drugs and devices for unap-
proved uses. The Kassebaum Bill seems to strike more of a balance between the
issues set forth above: That is, the FDA's desire to retain rather stringent con-
trols over the approval process to assure safety and ecacy of approved drugs
and devices, and that of the medical profession and patients who want increased
access to unapproved medical treatments.
The bill provides increased access to unapproved therapies but only if the
investigational provisions of the FDCA are complied with.'26 A patient with a
seriously debilitating disease'27 would have access, through a licensed health care
practitioner, to such unapproved drug or device if there was no other available
treatment that proved satisfactory for the patients condition. In order to receive
the treatment, the risk from the investigational drug or device must not be
greater than the risk from the patient's condition.'28 Based on the language of
the Kassebaum Bill, it is
126 ~ 1477, x 202, Access to Unapproved Therapies. Unlike the ANTA
which permits access to unapproved medical treatments without going through
the FDA approval process. See supra, footnotes 74-126 and accompanying text.
127 The committee stated that the broad language regarding serious condi-
tions was purposeful. Illnesses that do not cause death can nonetheless destroy
the lives of both patients and their families. The committee therefore intends
that the seriousness of an illness be given broad consideration, to take into
account of all the circumstances involved. Kassebaum Bill at 23.
128 Id.
31
32unclear what must be shown in order to satisfy the requirement that no other
conventional treatment has been eective. Issues arise as to whether other
treatments have to be tried rst, and if so, for how long. Also whether the
non-approved therapy be tried simultaneously with approved measures. The
current wording of the proposed provision seems dicult for a practitioner to
apply. Additionally, the Kassebaum bill provides that the FDA inform the
medical community of available investigational drugs and devices. 129
The Kassebaum bill also addresses the unapproved use by the medical pro-
fession of approved drugs. Unapproved uses of approved new drugs account for
perhaps half of the use of drugs in this country today. In some specialty areas,
such as cancer, of abel uses can be 60 percent or higher.'30 The cumbersome
and costly FDA approval process for a new use of an approved drug or device
is often a disincentive for manufacturers to le supplemental applications. 131
The result is that many unapproved uses have become standard medical prac-
tice yet the drug or device label does not reect such use. The Kassebaum bill
seeks to address this problem by attempting to streamline and encourage the
approval process for additional uses of an already approved drug or
129 The Committee on Labor and Human Resources stated that [t]his pro-
vision will help to ensure that all patients will have equal knowledge of and
access to investigational products. Kassebaum Bill at 23.
130 Id. at 35.
Id.
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33device 132
The Kassebaum Bill provides physicians and patients wider latitude to gain
access to unapproved drugs and devices. Also by encouraging approval of non-
approved uses of an approved drug or device, it gives health care practitioners
increased knowledge of proper uses.
The Current Dilemma Regarding Unapproved Uses
Currently, once the FDA approves a drug or medical device for a particular
use it may be placed on the market. However, after a drug or device is available
to the public, the FDA does not regulate its use. In fact it is quite common
for a physician to prescribe an approved drug for uses that are not within the
indications articulated by the FDA.'33 Conversely, it is illegal for a physician
to prescribe, use or administer an unapproved drug or medical device.'34 Under
both scenarios, a physician is prescribing a medical treatment that has not been
deemed safe and eective by the FDA, yet the rst instance is legal and the
second could open the doctor to criminal charges.
Unapproved Use of FDA A~~roved Treatments
The FDA seems to view its mandate as establishing the safety and ecacy
of drugs and devices under the conditions set forth by the manufacturer,'35 not
whether a medical treatment is safe for the
132 Id. at 35-36.
See supra, fn.133 and accompanying text.
~ 21 U.S.C.A. x 333.
cite to 37 FR 16503?
33
34use it is actually prescribed. The general public is likely under the impression
that if their doctor is prescribing a medical treatment, it has been tested and
approved for that particular use. However, based on the Practice of Medicine
Exception, the FDA has specically recognized the legality of using drugs'36 and
devices'37 for purposes other than those for which they have been approved.
A drug is placed on the market with recommendations for use which are
developed jointly by the manufacturer and the FDA after reviewing clinical data.
A former Commissioner of the FDA stated that: The FDA's responsibility is
limited to insuring that there are sucient data to conclude that the drug is safe
and eective under the conditions of use proposed by the manufacturer. The
physicians of this country ... [are then free] to prescribe the drug as they see f
it.'38 The new drug provision of the FDCA only applies when drugs are shipped
in interstate commerce; they do not apply to subsequent physician action.'39
Once the new drug is in a local pharmacy ... the physician may, as part of the
practice of medicine, lawfully ... vary the conditions of use from those
136 FTC v. Simeon Management Corp., 532 F.2d 708, 717 (1976).
137 By analogy, the o-label use of a medical device is also a matter of
medical judgment. Klein v. Biscup, 673 N.E.2d. 225, 231 (19 )
138 New Drugs Used for Nonapproved Purposes (Methotrexate for
Psoriasis); Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on
Government Operations, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess at 133 (July 29 & 30,
1971)
Id.
34
35approved in the package insert.'~
Arguably, if the FDA's mandate is to protect the public from harmful drugs
and medical devices, it should test and approve all proposed medical treat-
ments. For example, a manufacturer receives FDA approval to market a drug
for the treatment of AIDS. Although during the testing process some of the
patients experiences severe side eects to the medication, the FDA approves
the drug, because the overall benets experienced by the terminally ill patients
outweighed the potential harm. Physicians began noticing that AIDS patients
with acne who used this drug, had marked improvement in their skin condition.
Thereafter, dermatologists began using the drug to treat their acne patients.
Some of the patients who were being treated for acne were seriously injured
from the side eects of the medication.
In the above hypothetical, the FDA approved use of the drug for the treat-
ment of AIDS patients was determined safe and eective given the circumstances
of use. If the manufacturer had sought to receive approval for this drug merely
for the treatment of a cosmetic problem, the FDA might have determined that
the severe side eects made the drug unsafe given the nonessential nature of
the treatment. However, the FDA has taken the position that the Practice
of Medicine Exception prevents the agency's intrusion into a physician's unap-
proved use of an approved drug
'~ 37 Fed. Reg. at 16503; see also, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.
V. Shalala, 91 F.3d 1493, 1496 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
35
36within the connes of the doctor-patient relationship.'4' The FDA's position
was seriously questioned in a congressional
subcommittee that was holding hearings on the issue of new drugs used
for nonapproved purposes, specically the use of methotrexate (approved as a
cancer drug) for the treatment of psoriasis. 142 Senator Fountain stated that
use of a drug should not be permitted until its safety and eectiveness is proven
with respect to its intended use. '~ He went on to comment, I believe with
certainty, that is one of the things which Congress had in mind back in 1962
when it enacted the drug amendments.' [H]uman life is precious and one human
life lost needlessly by unauthorized drug therapy is one too many. Particularly
when the disease does not threaten life.'45 Although physicians may be liable
for malpractice if they use a drug for an unapproved use, the obvious reality is
an after
141 Courts have also supported this position. The Act does not .. . limit
the manner in which a physician may use an approved drug. Once a product
has been approved for marketing, a physician may prescribe it for uses or in
treatment regimens or patient populations that are not included in approved la-
beling. Klein, at 864 (quoting Use of Approved Drugs for Unlabeled Indications,
12 FDA Drug Bulletin 4 (April 1982)).
Although the FDA has promulgated regulations that purport to regulate the
unapproved use of approved drugs, the regulations have never been nalized or
otherwise enforced. See supra, fn. 36-46 and corresponding test.
142 See generally, New Drugs Used for Nonapproved Purposes
(Methotrexate for Psoriasis); Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the
Committee on Government Operations, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess (July 29 &
30, 1971)
Id. at 104.
144 Id.
Id.
36
37the fact award of money damages
for a sacriced life . .. is small solace to those aected.'46 In a highly
industrialized and technical society with
biotechnical advances almost daily, it is dicult for the average consumer to
protect herself from unsafe or ineective products.'47 Thus the FDA's purpose is
to protect the general public in areas that are largely beyond self-protection.'48
If a drug, that has never been tested and proven safe and eective for a use for
which it is prescribed, how is the public protected?
Although the FDA claims that it does not have authority to regulate in
this area, the Practice of Medicine Exception does not appear to prevent the
opposite conclusion. There is no bright-line distinction between the mandate of
the FDA and the practice of medicine, in fact, the broad reaching jurisdiction of
the FDA guarantees that medical practice will be regulated to some extent. The
9/1 kg Containers court stated that if the FDA did not regulate the practice
of medicine - what does the statute do? Congress gave the FDA comprehensive
powers to license the manufacture of drugs and limit their sales. To regulate
drugs is to be 'involved' in the 'practice of the healing arts.''49 In order to protect
the general public, [s]omeone must draw on knowledge about risks and
'~ Id.
~ See generally, U.S. v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280 (1943) reh'g den.
320 U.S. 815.
148 Id.
U.S. v. 9/1 kg. Containers, 854 F.2d 173, 176 (7th Cir.
1988) , cert den. 489 U.S. 1010 (1989)
37
38needs and decide how much risk is too much; that someone is the Executive
Branch of the government.'50 The FDA's task in enforcing the FDCA is unde-
niably involves making judgments about medical subjects.
The 9/1 kg Containers court, in narrowly interpreting the scope of the Prac-
tice of Medicine Exception, stated that it should be restricted to the ability of
the states to license and discipline the medical professions. The court noted
that the states have the power to set appropriate medical qualications and
practitioners who do not use drugs (i.e., chiropractors) may go on as before.'5'
Although the court's comments were related to the compounding of unapproved
drugs, the rationale also supports the position that the FDA has authority to
assure the safety and eectiveness of all drug and medical device usage.
Use of an Una~~roved Drug
Health care practitioners are strictly prohibited from prescribing or otherwise
using an unapproved drug when treating a patient. Obviously, an unapproved
drug has not been tested for safety and ecacy by the FDA. However, the
basis for and rationale of the FDA decision to allow the unapproved use of an
approved drug or device but not the use of an unapproved medical treatment is
not clear. Arguably, the approval process of a drug
~so Id.
The court noted that the Senate in 1935 stated the statute is not intended as
a medical practices act and [would] not interfere with the practice of the healing
art by chiropractors and others. Id. at 176-77.
38
39or device determines some level of safety for human use. But if such treatment
is used in a completely dierent context from its initial approval, the safety of
the public is put into question.
The Weaver v. Reagen152 court stated that FDA approved uses were not
intended to interfere with the practice of medicine and should not be construed
to preclude physicians from using their best judgment in the interest of the
patient.'53 If this is the case, then why should physicians' best judgment to use
an unapproved drug or device criminalized?
A recent example of the FDA's position against the unapproved use of drugs
or devices is the criminal trial of a Texas doctor which began on January 7th
of this year.'54 Dr. Burzynski, a Houston physician is being criminally prose-
cuted for violating the FDCA by his use of an unapproved drug to treat cancer
patients. The doctor invented, patented, and manufactured an antineoplaston
treatment which he claims serves as a biochemical switch to turn o cancer
genes and prevent cancerous cells from multiplying in the human body.'55
Burzynski has only treated six of his patients under FDA approved clinical
trials and on the day his trial was to begin,
152 886 R.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1989)
Id. at 198.
154 The Dallas Morning News, Houston Cancer Doctor's Trial Delayed, lSA
(January 7, 1997)
~55 Chicago Sun-Times, Rebel Cancer Doctor To Go On Trial For Fraud, 19
(Jan 6, 1997)
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40approximately three hundred patients were receiving the drug.'56 The U.S.
Attorney stated that Burzynski was rst informed that he needed FDA ap-
proval in 1977.157 Over a two decade span, the doctor treated over three
thousand patients with his drug, yet never complied with the FDA's approval
requirements.'58
The FDA nally ordered Burzynski to not distribute the drug in interstate
commerce.'59 The doctor was also informed by the Texas Department of Health
that use of the drug within the state was also illegal because it did not have FDA
approval for use.'~ The defense states that Dr. Burzynski's actions were to fulll
his oath as a physician, which states that doctors do no harm, and he believes
that to withhold (antineoplaston) is to do harm.'6' Interestingly, the indictment
against Burzynski does not allege that the administration of the antineoplaston
treatment itself has caused any harm.'62 In fact, many of Burzynski's patients
swear
156 Chicago Sun-Times, Rebel Cancer Doctor To Go On Trial For Fraud,
19 (Jan 6, 1997)
~ The Dallas Morning News, Jury Told Doctor Delivered Drug Ille-
gally, 19A (January 8, 1997).
158 Los Angeles Times, Cancer Pioneer on Trial After Bucking the System,
AlE (January 12, 1997).
'~ Los Angeles Times, Cancer Pioneer on Trial After Bucking the System,
A16 (January 12, 1997)
U.S. v. Burzynski, Indictment p.9 (led Nov. 20, 1995)
161 The Dallas Morning News, Jury Told Doctor Delivered Drug Illegally,
19A (January 8, 1997)
162 See generally, U.S. v. Burzynski, Indictment (led Nov.
20, 1995). This article distinguishes harm owing from the medical treat-
ment from injury that may result from a patient forgoing other potentially
eective treatments. See supra, fn.
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41that his treatment has saved their lives when practitioners who provided more
conventional treatment told them to prepare for death.'63 One father, testifying
to a congressional committee about his son's treatment by Burzynski stated:
Burzynski is guilty of saving lives illegally. If helping sick people live is irrelevant
to enforcing rules, than the police should start pulling over ambulances and re
trucks for speeding.'~
If Burzynski's drug had received approval for any type of treatment, even if
completely unrelated to the treatment of cancer, he would not be being prose-
cuted. In either instance however, the issue of safety and ecacy would not have
been determined by the FDA for the use of the treatment in cancer patients.
This inconsistency, in oversight and enforcement for essentially the same action,
should be reconciled.
Reconciling FDA Action Regarding Unapproved Uses
It should be noted that under both of the above scenarios, patients have
malpractice claims against their health care
114-115 and accompanying test.
163 Los Angeles Times, Cancer Pioneer on Trial After Bucking the System,
A16 (January 12, 1997). The Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the
Commerce Committee heard testimony from Burzynski patients who testied
that his treatment cured them or helped them. Government Press Releases,
Background on Access to Medical Treatment Hearing, (February 22, 1996). A
group of 100 patients and their families gathered outside the federal courthouse
in support of Burzynski on the rst day of his criminal trial. Houston Chronicle,
Cancer Doctor Says Patients Need Him 13 (January 7, 1997).
'~ Cong. Testimony, Access to Medical Treatment Act S1035 (July 30, 1996)
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42practitioner if the drug or device causes harm. 165 In contrast to the tort
system which merely attempts to compensate for tragedies that have already
occurred, the FDA is empowered by Congress to intervene and prevent harm
to the general public. Therefore, the FDA should not defer to a retrospective
solution when its mandate is prospective in nature.
As indicated, the FDA currently permits some unapproved uses of drugs and
medical devices, without proof of safety and ecacy, yet prohibits others. This
inconsistent enforcement scheme does not appear to be required by Congress
based on the Practice of Medicine Exception. If the FDA's goal is to protect the
general public from harm, not merely approve a drug or device for a specic use
- all uses should arguably be approved. The U.S. v. Article'~ court stated that
the FDA's responsibility was to protect the ultimate consumer, which included
protection of the ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous.'67 In this case,
the ultimate consumer is the patient and therefore it should be the FDA's
responsibility to protect patients, even from their doctor if
'~ See e.g., Klein, 673 N.E.2d at 231 (an o-label us of a medical device
may subject a physician to malpractice liability) It has been argued that FDA
involvement in this area is not necessary because market forces are sucient
to control physician's unapproved uses via malpractice (deviation from FDA
approved use may be evidence of negligence) and insurance reimbursement (in-
surer may not reimburse unapproved medical treatments) . Walsh & Pyrich,
Rationalizing the Regulation of Prescription Drugs and Medical Devices: Per-
spectives on Private Certication and Tort Reform, 48 Rutgers L. Rev. 883,
1041 (1996)
'~ 409 F.2d 734 (2nd Cir. 1969)
167 Id. at 740.
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28 (1995)
necessary. By this statement I am not implying that physicians or other
practitioners intentionally harm patients. However, doctors often do not have
extensive training in pharmacology and may be ill equipped to decide whether
a prescription for an unapproved use of an approved medication is proper.
Additionally, under the current system, a potentially uniformed physician
may have a dicult time in obtaining information about the proper unapproved
uses of an approved medical treatment. The FDA prohibits a manufacturer from
advertising an unapproved use of its product.'~ If the FDA permits unapproved
uses, the general public is better protected if physicians have access to as much
truthful information about drug or medical device usage. If the FDA refuses to
mandate safety and ecacy testing for all uses of a drug or device, it should not
leave the public even more unprotected by preventing health care practitioners
access to all available truthful information regarding proper usage of the unap-
proved use. Therefore, a situation may arise where a doctor is prescribing an
approved drug or device for an unapproved use, with very little information at
her disposal.
To leave the general public even more unprotected, all states do not man-
date that the patient be informed of this situation prior to deciding whether to
consent to treatment. Patients do not have to be informed that the medication
or device they are being
Washington Legal Foundation v. Kessler, 880 F.Supp. 26, 43
44prescribed is not approved by the FDA for the patients' intended use. The
Klein court stated that [o]f f-label use of a medical device is not a material
risk inherently involved in a proposed therapy which a physician should disclose
to a patient prior to the therapy. ... Accordingly, we conclude that failure
to disclose FDA status does not raise a material issue of fact as to informed
consent.'69 The patient is therefore potentially at greater risk once a device or
drug has been approved then if the same item merely had investigational status.
When a drug or device is still being tested but is available to human subjects,
the FDA provides for stringent controls on informed consent.'70
However, from a practical standpoint, the FDA approval process does not
dovetail with the immediacy of treatment needs within the doctor-patient re-
lationship. If the FDA controlled all uses of a drug or medical device, medical
practice as we know it would grind to a halt. Additionally, enforcement of
such a policy would be virtually impossible, especially given already strained
agency resources. To rectify this problem, the FDA seems to have two reason-
able choices: Require approval for all uses but signicantly expedite the review
and approval of new uses of
169 Klein, 673 N.E.2d at 231 (doctor failure to inform patient that device
implanted in spine did not have FDA approval for such use did not violate
informed consent requirements); see also, In re Orthopedic..., 1996 WL 107556
(1996) (The FDA labels given to a medical device do not speak directly to
the medical issues surrounding a particular surgery, They are not, therefore,
required to be disclosed pursuant to the law of informed consent)
170 See e.g., 21 U.S.C.A x 355(i) (3).
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45already approved drugs and devices, or allow unapproved uses under certain
circumstances.
The issue essentially boils down to a safety verses ecacy issue. At present,
the FDA appears satises that a drug, once approved for some use is relatively
save, even if used for an unapproved use. It seems to follow that if an unapproved
medical treatment is not harmful, the FDA should allow its use until ecacy
is proven or disproven. Under either scenario, the FDA retains the power to
prohibit the use of use of a drug or device, whether approved or unapproved,
when incidents of unreasonable harm are shown.
Conclusion
The FDA has recognized a Practice of Medicine in the FDCA although it
is not specically referred to within the statutory scheme. This exception has
not been well dened by the agency and its implementation currently leads to
inconsistent an inappropriate results. The FDA should reconcile its position
on the unapproved uses of approved medical treatments and its prohibition
regarding the unapproved use of drugs and devices.
Practicality dictates that it would be virtually impossible for the FDA to
approve every use of a drug or device before allowing its use by the medical
community and the public at large. Therefore, it seems reasonable to permit
unapproved treatments under controlled, FDA supervised, circumstances. The
Kassebaum Bill begins this process.
Allowing greater medical access to treatments is likely in the
45
46public interest and is reasonably enforceable. However, it should be a require-
ment that a patient is informed of the lack of FDA approval, in either the case of
an unapproved use of an approved drug or device, or the use of an unapproved
medical treatment. In both situations, safety and ecacy has not been ascer-
tained and a patient should have a right to this important information prior to
consenting to medical treatment. The FDA within its existing mandate has the
authority to rectify this inappropriate inconsistency.
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